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  Abstract 
The paper proposes a model where heterogeneous firms choose whether to undertake 
R&D or not. Depending on R&D choice, innovative firms are more productive, have larger 
investment opportunities and lower own funds than non-innovating firms. As a result, 
innovative firms are financially constrained while standard firms are not. The efficiency of the 
financial sector and a country's institutional quality relating to corporate governance 
determine the share of R&D intensive firms and the comparative advantage in innovative 
goods. We show how protection, R&D subsidies and financial development improve access 
to external finance in distinct ways, support the expansion of innovative industries and boost 
national welfare. International welfare spillovers depend on the interaction between terms of 
trade effects and financial frictions and may be positive or negative, depending on foreign 
countries' trade position.  
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 1 Introduction
Innovative ﬁrms are more frequently ﬁnance constrained than less innovative ones. Be-
ing innovative, they tend to have large investment opportunities but may not be able
to fully exploit them because of credit rationing. R&D intensive sectors are thus ﬁnan-
cially dependent in the sense of Rajan and Zingales (1998). Access to ﬁnance and the
quality of the ﬁnancial system becomes important for the expansion of innovative indus-
tries. In this paper, building on earlier work by Keuschnigg and Ribi (2010) and Egger
and Keuschnigg (2010), we propose a two sector model that endogenously explains the
emergence of ﬁnance constraints. We distinguish between a standard sector where the
Modigliani Miller irrelevance theorem applies, and an innovative sector where ﬁrms are
potentially constrained in the access to external ﬁnance. Innovative sector production
is driven by entrepreneurial ﬁrms which are heterogeneous in their early stage survival
probabilities. After entry, they decide whether or not to undertake a discrete R&D in-
vestment with two consequences: (i) R&D spending uses up own assets and (ii) creates
higher productivity which results in a larger optimal scale of expansion investment. These
ﬁrms are the prototype of highly productive growth companies with few own assets and
large investment opportunities, are ﬁnancially dependent and require a large amount of
external funds. Non-innovative, standard ﬁrms do not invest in R&D and are left with
undiminished and relatively large own assets but low productivity. Being less productive,
these ﬁrms optimally invest at a small scale and are naturally unconstrained.
Since the fraction of innovative growth companies in the R&D intensive sector results
from a discrete innovation decision, our model endogenously explains not only the con-
strained level of investment per ﬁrm and the resulting excess return on capital, but also
the share of ﬁrms subject to ﬁnance constraints. In other words, we explain the role of
ﬁnance constraints in determining the intensive and extensive margins of innovative ﬁrm
investments. Finance constraints result from a moral hazard problem in the relationship
between an entrepreneur and outside investors as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and
Tirole (2001, 2006). For external funding to be incentive compatible, entrepreneurs must
1keep a minimum stake in the ﬁrm which limits the amount of funds (pledgeable income)
that are available to pay back external credit. The amount of pledgeable income thus
determines the ﬁrm’s debt capacity, the amount of external funds that it can raise from
banks or other outside investors.
We explicitely model the quality of ﬁnancial intermediation by introducing the moni-
toring capacity of a country’s banking sector. Speciﬁcally, we distinguish between passive,
standard banks and active intermediaries supplying monitoring services. Active interme-
diaries might be venture capitalists, specialized investment banks, ‘Hausbanken’ or other
intermediaries engaged in relationship banking. On the negative side, monitoring is costly
and raises the cost of capital. On the positive side, monitoring narrows down private ben-
eﬁts from managerial misbehavior, relaxes the incentive constraint and raises ﬁrms’ debt
capacity. Improving access to external credit boosts ﬁrm value since it allows to undertake
additional investments with an above normal return. If monitoring is suﬃciently produc-
tive, monitoring capital becomes valuable to innovative ﬁrms even if it is more expensive
than standard bank ﬁnancing. In our model, innovative ﬁrms thus have multiple sources
of external funds. They attract a minimum amount of expensive monitoring capital while
the remaining credit comes from standard bank ﬁnancing.
Having introduced a monitoring role of the banking sector, we interpret ﬁnancial sector
development to mean that active banks become more productive in performing monitor-
ing functions at a given marginal cost. Since more intensive monitoring boosts access
to external funds, a country with a more developed ﬁnancial sector should have more
innovative ﬁrms, because monitoring is useful only to constrained ﬁrms, and these ﬁrms
should invest at a larger scale, compared to countries with a less mature ﬁnancial sector.
Financial sector development thus relaxes ﬁnance constraints on the intensive and ex-
tensive margins and thereby encourages innovation by R&D intensive growth companies.
The ﬁnancial sector becomes a source of comparative advantage in innovative industries.
Based on this framework, the paper investigates the role of three alternative policy
approaches which address ﬁnancial frictions in distinct ways. The key results are the
2following. Assuming that the home country is importing innovative goods, we ﬁnd that
import protection, in raising the domestic price and earnings per ﬁrm, also boosts the debt
capacity of constrained ﬁrms. Protection thereby relaxes ﬁnance constraints and allows
innovative ﬁrms with an above normal rate of return to invest at a larger scale. For this
reason, a small level of protection can raise domestic welfare, provided that terms of trade
eﬀects in the importing country are small. The second policy is an R&D subsidy which
boosts innovation and welfare, not because of knowledge spillovers which are excluded
in our model, but because these subsidies strengthen the internal funds for ﬁnancing
subsequent expansion investment. Being left with larger own assets after R&D spending,
innovating ﬁrms succeed to attract a larger amount of external funds, allowing them
to more fully exploit proﬁtable investment opportunities with an excess rate of return.
The policy again boosts national welfare and shifts comparative advantage towards the
innovative sector.
Finally, we investigate the consequences of ﬁnancial sector development. A higher
monitoring productivity also raises ﬁrms’ debt capacity, relaxes ﬁnance constraints in the
innovative sector and boosts national welfare. The quality of the ﬁnancial sector becomes
a source of comparative advantage in the R&D intensive and ﬁnancially dependent sector.
While all three policies reduce ﬁnancial frictions in the innovative sector and yield welfare
gains at home, the consequences on foreign welfare are less clear and depend on the speciﬁc
interaction of terms of trade eﬀects and ﬁnancial frictions. The reduction in the world
price strongly hurts foreign export nations, not only because of a negative terms of trade
eﬀect, but also because the lower prices tightens ﬁnance constraints. In foreign import
countries, the lower price yields positive terms of trade eﬀects which tend to oﬀset the
negative consequences on ﬁnancial frictions.
The unique and novel contributions of the present paper are the following. First,
we endogenously explain the emergence of ﬁnancing constraints by a discrete innovation
decision which splits ﬁrms into highly productive, constrained ﬁrms with large invest-
ment opportunities and less productive unconstrained ﬁrms optimally investing at a small
3scale. The share of innovative and ﬁnancially dependent ﬁrms and their constrained level
of equipment investment is endogenously explained. Average productivity and R&D in-
tensity in the innovative sector is thus determined by the degree of ﬁnancial frictions.
Second, we investigate and compare how three diﬀerent policy approaches, consisting
of protection, R&D subsidies and ﬁnancial development, aﬀect ﬁnancial constraints, na-
tional equilibrium and the trade pattern of a country. Instead of analyzing institutional
country characteristics such as corporate governance, accounting standards and investor
protection etc. (as in Egger and Keuschnigg, 2010, for example), we analyze here the
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial sector eﬃciency accross countries relating to the monitoring func-
tions of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Third, we provide a complete analysis of national and
international welfare consequences of these policy alternatives and show how they depend
on the interaction between terms of trade eﬀects and ﬁnancial frictions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature review. Section
3 sets up the model, Section 4 analyzes equilibrium and comparative static eﬀects of
policy intervention in a small open economy, and Section 5 turns to policy eﬀecs in a
large economy in world equilibrium. The concluding section summarizes the key insights.
2 A Review of the Literature
The main building blocks of our model are well backed by empirical evidence. The theo-
retical prediction of the cash-ﬂow sensitivity of investment has been studied extensively in
the empirical literature (for a survey, see Hubbard, 1998). Schaller (1993) and Chirinko
and Schaller (1995) ﬁnd correlations between physical capital investment and internal
funds around 0.4 for small ﬁrms, which are substantially higher than the corresponding
values of around 0.2 for large ﬁrms. Apart from ﬁrm size, another criterion that diﬀerenti-
ates constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms, is their banking relationship. When ﬁrms have
close ties to banks, the informational asymmetry is reduced, and they are more likely to
obtain the required funding for their projects. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)
4indeed report investment - cash ﬂow sensitivities of only around 0.05 for these types of
ﬁrms in Japan, whereas correlations for independent ﬁrms vary between 0.45-0.5. Similar
numbers are found by Schaller (1993) and Chirinko and Schaller (1995) who separate
ﬁrms according to their relationship to other groups of ﬁrms. Spending on physical assets
captures only part of a ﬁrm’s total investments. When all categories including working
capital are taken into account, the sensitivity of total investment to cash ﬂow in con-
strained ﬁrms typically exceeds 1 (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Calomiris and Hubbard,
1995; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Kaplan and Zingales (1997) emphasize that in-
vestments of constrained ﬁrms should be sensitive to internal cash-ﬂow while investment
of unconstrained ﬁrms should not. However, the magnitude of the sensitivity does not
necessarily increase in the degree of ﬁnancing constraints.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that ﬁnancing constraints are prevalent in countries
with poorly developed ﬁnancial markets and that these restrictions impair the growth of
companies dependent on external ﬁnance. In diﬀerentiating by ﬁrm size, Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁnancing constraints are most relevant for small
ﬁrms. As ﬁnancial and institutional characteristics improve, constraints become less tight.
Small ﬁrms catch up and beneﬁt the most. These results are conﬁrmed by Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) who focus on the importance of alternative sources of
ﬁnance for small and large ﬁrms. Well developed property rights boost external ﬁnancing
in small ﬁrms more strongly than in large ﬁrms. The increase mainly results from easier
access to bank credit. Other sources of ﬁnance are not able to compensate for lacking
access to bank ﬁnancing. The same ﬁnding is reported by Fisman and Love (2003) who
study trade credit as an alternative funding source when ﬁnancial markets are poorly
developed. The importance of ﬁrm size for ﬁnancial market access is already apparent
when a ﬁrm is created (see Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta, 2007). Financial development
most strongly raises entry rates of smaller ﬁrms whereas entry of larger ﬁrms shows no or
even a negative response. Even in advanced economies, there is scope to promote entry
of small ﬁrms and their subsequent growth by improving institutions.
5Innovative ﬁrms are more likely to become credit rationed. Because of its novelty
and potentially high technical sophistication, an innovative business idea aggravates in-
formation problems for outside investors. Further, the knowledge to carry out the project
successfully is often intrinsic which makes the entrepreneur’s eﬀort essential but, at the
same time, also very diﬃcult to monitor. In addition, since innovative ﬁrms by their very
deﬁnition are highly productive, they have large investment opportunities and need large
external funds which, again, makes it likely that the ﬁnancing capacity is exhausted and
investment becomes ﬁnance constrained. The empirical literature conﬁrms that external
ﬁnancing of R&D activities itself, especially in small ﬁrms, is severely constrained and
must, to a very large extent, be self-ﬁnanced (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Ughetto,
2008; Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2009). The cost of capital that is used for R&D
spending is much higher than the one associated with more traditional investment. In
our model, we have assumed R&D spending to be fully self-ﬁnanced. Furthermore, Guiso
(1998) and Ughetto (2009) show that innovative ﬁrms are in general more likely to be
constrained in all their activities requiring external funding which makes them unable to
fully exploit the investment potential created by their innovations.
The empirical literature has extensively studied the eﬀects of innovation incentives
and tax credits on private R&D. With regard to ﬁscal R&D incentives, Hall and Van
Reenen (2000) conclude that one dollar in tax credits leads to about one dollar of addi-
tional business R&D. In their cross-country study, Bloom, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (2002)
ﬁnd that when tax credits reduce the cost of R&D by 10%, one can expect the level of
R&D activity to rise by roughly 10% in the long run. More so than with standard invest-
ment, the quality of inventions, their market potential and innovative ﬁrms’ investment
opportunities are diﬃcult to judge by outside investors. The empirical literature conﬁrms
that capital costs are higher for R&D intensive investment than for standard investment,
especially for small ﬁrms (cf. Hall, 2002; Hall and Lerner, 2009). Consistent with the fact
that these ﬁrms mainly rely on internal resources to ﬁnance their innovation activities,
the correlation between investment and own cash ﬂow is also signiﬁcantly higher for the
R&D intensive investment category (Brown and Petersen, 2009).
6In international economics, early theoretical work by Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) and
Baldwin (1989) delivered key hypotheses about the tightness of credit constraints (through
diﬀerences between countries’ domestic institutions for credit enforcement) as a source of
comparative advantage in the production of goods which require more credit than other
goods. Evidence in favor of that view has been provided by Beck (2002, 2003), Svaleryd
and Vlachos (2005), and Manova (2008a). This research concludes that countries with
better developed ﬁnancial institutions have a comparative advantage in industries which
rely more intensively on external ﬁnance, and ﬁnancial market liberalization increases ex-
ports disproportionately more in ﬁnancially vulnerable sectors where ﬁrms require more
outside ﬁnance and have fewer assets serving as collateral. The results in Svaleryd and
Vlachos (2005) indicate that diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems may be even more impor-
tant for specialization patterns than diﬀerences in human capital.1 Gorodnichenko and
Schnitzer (2010) examine how ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect a ﬁrm’s innovation and export
activities. In testing their theoretical predictions, they ﬁnd unambiguous evidence that
ﬁnancial constraints strongly impair the ability of ﬁrms to innovate and to export.
Part of the work on ﬁnance constraints in open economies focuses on trade and inter-
national capital ﬂows. For instance, Matsuyama (2004) explores how ﬁnancing frictions
determine capital ﬂows in a one-good world economy. Matsuyama (2005) studies trade
and capital ﬂows in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods where hiring of workers
is constrained by a ﬁrm’s pledgeable income to pay wages. The ‘borrowing constraint’ thus
relates to hiring rather than investment. Antras and Caballero (2009) develop a 2×2×2
model where one sector is ﬁnancially constrained and the other is not. A key result is that
trade and capital movements are complements in ﬁnancially less developed countries. Ju
and Wei (2008) develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model with mobile capital where sectors dif-
fer by the extent of ﬁnancial frictions and ﬁrms within sectors are homogeneous. They
emphasize that, in addition to factor endowments and technology, the quality of institu-
1Do and Levchenko (2007) present evidence that ﬁnancial development depends on trade patterns
and argue that ﬁnancial development is endogenous and in part determined by the demand for external
ﬁnancing which might be inﬂuenced by trade patterns shifting towards ﬁnancially dependent sectors.
7tions determines the patterns of trade and capital ﬂows. This literature mainly embeds
ﬁnancial constraints in models with otherwise classical or neoclassical — Heckscher-Ohlin
or Ricardian — reasons for trade.
Some recent theoretical work abstracts from classical endowment- and productivity-
related motives for trade and focuses on the role of ﬁnancial constraints on the entry of
heterogeneous ﬁrms in new trade models. For instance, Manova (2008b) embeds ﬁnancial
constraints in a one-sector model of heterogeneous ﬁrms and illustrates how ﬁnance con-
straints not only aﬀect the pattern but even the volume of trade through ﬁrm selection.
A novel insight is that productivity of ﬁrms in a market is endogenously determined by
ﬁnancial constraints and their impact on ﬁrm selection. Chor, Foley, and Manova (2008)
introduce credit constraints in the model of export-platform FDI of Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004) with heterogeneous ﬁrms. In particular, they model credit constraints to
arise from the imperfect protection of lenders against default risk. Host country ﬁnancial
development leads to more competition for subsidiaries of foreign-owned ﬁrms in that
market. The latter leads to a larger fraction of foreign aﬃliate exports to third countries
relative to their total sales and, hence, a more extensive use of these subsidiaries as export
platforms. They ﬁnd evidence in support of this hypothesis in a panel data-set of U.S.
foreign aﬃliates for the years 1989-1998. In a model with ﬁnancial frictions, Antras, Desai
and Foley (2009) argue that weak investor protection limits the scale of multinational ﬁrm
activity, increase the reliance on foreign direct investment ﬂows, and alters the decision
to deploy technology through FDI as opposed to arm’s length technology transfers. They
test and conﬁrm these predictions with ﬁrm level-data.
3 The Model
3.1 Overview
We develop a multicountry model of innovation, trade and ﬁnance, including two goods
and two factors in each country. We ﬁrst introduce the structure of the domestic economy,
8taking the world prices as given. A standard sector produces the numeraire good with
a Ricardian technology that transforms one unit of labor into one unit of output, and
one unit of a capital good into R units of output. The attention mainly focusses on the
innovative sector which consists of heterogeneous, entrepreneurial ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are
driven by entrepreneurs who make risky innovation and investment choices. They have
limited own assets and are potentially ﬁnance constrained.
Capital and labor endowments are distributed among risk-neutral agents. There are
L workers without assets who have no managerial talent and can only work in the Ricar-
dian sector, earning a competitive wage equal to unity. The country also hosts a mass
1 of wealthy individuals endowed with assets A per capita. A ﬁxed fraction E has en-
trepreneurial ability, the others not. Part 1 − E can invest A either in deposits paying
a safe interest r, or in a linear investment technology which transforms one unit of en-
dowment into R = 1 + r units of the standard good. The Ricardian technology in the
standard sector ﬁxes the deposit rate as well as the wage rate. Entrepreneurs run a ﬁrm
in the innovative sector and earn an expected surplus πE on top of AR. Hence, all E
individuals who are able to manage a ﬁrm, prefer to invest all their wealth in their own
ﬁrm, rather than investing in the capital market. A ﬁrm’s life-cycle consists of three
stages, an early R&D phase, an expansion phase with physical capital investment, and
a mature production stage. Firms can fail both in the R&D and expansion stage. At
the beginning, entrepreneurs draw a risky project of type q′ ∈ [0,1] from the distribution
G(q) =
￿ q
0 g(q′)dq′. Types diﬀer by the early stage success probability q′ of the project.
Conditional on surviving the early R&D stage, ﬁrms may still fail with probability 1 − p
during the expansion stage where the success rate p is a matter of managerial eﬀort.
Depending on occupational activity and on success and failure in entrepreneurship,
a speciﬁc person i may have quite diﬀerent income yi. All agents are endowed with
preferences that are linearly separable in consumption and private beneﬁts Bi (leisure),
ui = u(ciN,ciE)+Bi, where u is linearly homogeneous and ciN and ciE refer to consumption
of standard and entreprenerial, innovative goods. Financial contracts will prevent shirking
9so that private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs are zero in equilibrium. Given end of period
income yi and a relative price v, demand follows from
ui = max
ciN,ciE
{u(ciN,ciE) s.t. ciN + vciE ￿ yi}. (1)
Welfare is equal to real income, ui = yi/vD, and changes by ˆ ui = ˆ yi − ˆ vD. The exact
consumer price index vD (v) adjusts according to ˆ vD = ηˆ v. Without loss of generality, we
specialize to Cobb Douglas preferences, implying ﬁxed expenditure shares, η ≡ vciE/yi
and 1 − η ≡ ciN/yi.
Workers are subject to a lump-sum tax T, giving income yL = 1 − T per capita.
Investors earn yI = AR independent of asset allocation while entrepreneurs earn on
average more than investors, yE = AR+πE. Expected proﬁt πE reﬂects a rent so that all
E agents with entrepreneurial ability indeed prefer to invest in their own ﬁrm. However,
when the business fails, all assets are lost and income drops to zero. Early on, ﬁrms may
invest an amount k in R&D spending which yields a higher productivity. The government
can grant a speciﬁc subsidy σ which reduces private R&D cost to k − σ. The returns to
R&D accrue only if a ﬁrm survives the start-up period. Hence, only those ﬁrms with a
high survival chance q′ ﬁnd it worthwhile to invest in R&D. Firms with a low survival
chance are not able to suﬃciently beneﬁt from innovation and do not invest in R&D.



















The subindex points to innovative (type c, constrained) and standard ﬁrms (type u,
unconstrained). When successfully completing the early stage, expected proﬁt of an
innovating ﬁrm is πc while a standard one expects only πu. As will be explained in more
detail below, only ﬁrms with good projects q′ > q choose R&D, invest kc = k − σ, and
get larger proﬁts πc > πu. Other ﬁrms do not innovate, avoid R&D spending (ku = 0)
and get a lower proﬁt.
103.2 Innovation and Investment
Setting up an entrepreneurial ﬁrm with own assets A leads to the following sequence of
events: (i) based on project type q′, ﬁrms decide on R&D investment kj ∈ {0,k − σ},
leaving residual assets Aj = A − kj; (ii) when surviving the early stage, ﬁrms choose
investment Ij and apply for credit Ij −Aj, possibly from diﬀerent sources; (iii) when the
investment is installed, entrepreneurs supply managerial eﬀort and banks choose moni-
toring eﬀort (if necessary), leading to a high success probability p if both types of eﬀort
are high. If ﬁnancing is not incentive compatible, the success probability falls to pL < p.
Externally ﬁnanced investment is subject to a double moral hazard where the incentive
of an entrepreneur to supply high managerial eﬀort depends on the monitoring level of
the active bank, and vice versa; (vi) ﬁrms produce output and pay back external funds if
investment is successful. In case of failure, either in the early innovation or the subsequent
expansion stage, all assets are lost and the ﬁrm is closed down.
R&D investment in stage ii is assumed to be fully self-ﬁnanced with own assets
and, thus, reduces a company’s internal resources available for self-ﬁnancing of expan-
sion investment. After self-ﬁnanced R&D, ﬁrms have productivity θj and residual assets
Aj = A − kj. The R&D choice naturally dichotomizes innovative sector ﬁrms into cash-
poor growth companies and cash-rich, but less productive standard ﬁrms. Innovative
growth companies are highly productive, θc > 1, but prior R&D leaves them with low
assets Ac = A − (k − σ). Non-innovating, passive ﬁrms are less productive but are left
with relatively high assets, θu = 1 and Au = A. Given the assumptions below, and in line
with observed ﬁrm characteristics, growth companies are ﬁnance constrained while stan-
dard ﬁrms are not. Being ﬁnance constrained, growth companies will not be able to fully
exploit their investment opportunities. Furthermore, the fraction of ﬁnance constrained
ﬁrms in the innovative sector will be endogenous, i.e. ﬁnance constraints operate on the
extensive and intensive margins.
At the end of period, ﬁrms sell output xj = θjf (Ij) in the innovative goods market at
a relative price v while undepreciated capital Ij adds to traditional sector output. After
11innovation, the ﬁrm needs external funds Ij − Aj to ﬁnance expansion investment. If
necessary, it can obtain funds Dm
j from active, monitoring banks (e.g. venture capital,
investment banks, ‘Hausbanken’) and Dj = Ij − Aj − Dm
j from other passive banks. All
ﬁnancial institutions are assumed competitive. Expected proﬁt πe
j, equal to the surplus



















mIj = 0, (3)
π
b
j = p(1 + i)Dj − RDj = 0,
πj = p(Ij + vxj) − c
mIj − RIj.
Active banks incur real monitoring costs equal to cmIj, measured in terms of labor or
sector 2 output. With competitive intermediation, proﬁts of ﬁnancial ﬁrms are zero so
that entrepreneurs appropriate the full surplus πe
j = πj. This surplus is, however, reduced
by monitoring costs if active banks are involved. Competition ﬁxes the interest rate i > r
on standard business loans and yields a convenient form of expected proﬁt,
p(1 + i) = R ⇒ πj = p(vxj − iIj) − c
mIj. (4)
We analyze the case where innovative ﬁrms ﬁnd it preferable to raise more expensive
monitored funds and, at the same time, cheaper non-monitored credit. Monitoring capital
is more expensive since, in addition to the same reﬁnancing cost R per Euro of credit,
active banks must also cover monitoring cost. Being more expensive, ﬁrms will resort
to monitoring capital only to the extent that they need it, and prefer to ﬁnance with
standard credit to the largest possible extent.
Stage iii, managerial eﬀort and monitoring: Once the ﬁrm has determined
investment and raised the necessary external funds, it may fail due to a lack of eﬀort.
There is a double moral hazard in (discrete) eﬀort choice. Low managerial eﬀort results
in a low success probability pL < p where ∇ ≡ p − pL. When shirking and providing
low eﬀort, the success probability and, thus, expected income is low but the entrepreneur
12enjoys private beneﬁts bIj if she is monitored, and BIj if she is not, where B > b.
Monitoring thus makes shirking less rewarding. After external ﬁnancing is arranged,
entrepreneurs and banks know their income share in the success state. The size of their
proﬁt share determines whether the reward is large enough to motivate high monitoring
and managerial eﬀort. If successful, the entrepreneur gets residual earnings ye
j ≡ Ij+vxj−
(1 + i)Dj − ym
j , while the monitor gets ym
j ≡ (1 + im)Dm
j . Given that she is monitored,
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The monitoring condition reﬂects the following trade-oﬀ. Suppose the managerial in-
centive constraint is tight when the bank monitors. In this case, the monitoring bank
gets pym
j . If she does not monitor, the entrepreneur enjoys larger private beneﬁts and
prefers shirking which reduces the success probability to pL. Expected repayment falls to
pLym
j , but the bank can assign employees hired for monitoring to other tasks generating
income cmIj, leading to expected earnings of the bank equal to pLym
j + cmIj. The incen-
tive to monitor consists of the rise in expected income from disciplining the entrepreneur.
With double moral hazard, both constraints must be satisﬁed simultaneously. The role of
monitoring is to limit managerial discretion so that entrepreneurs are incentivized with a
smaller income stake, leaving a larger part of cash-ﬂow for repayment of external funds.
Monitoring thus raises a ﬁrm’s pledgeable income and improves access to external funds.
Stage ii, investment and external funds: If a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially unconstrained,
it chooses passive bank ﬁnancing. Monitoring capital would only be more expensive but
can play no useful role since there is no need to improve access to external funds. The
ﬁrst best level of investment maximizes expected proﬁt πe
u = πu in (3) with cm = 0. As
in neoclassical theory, the ﬁrm invests until the marginal return on investment is equal to
the user cost of capital,
vf
′ (Iu) = i, πu = p(vxu − iIu). (6)
13Banks are willing to lend (without monitoring) if the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint
is slack at this ﬁrst best investment level.
Assumption 1 (i) At Iu determined by vf′ (Iu) = i, we have ye
u (Iu) > IuB/∇.
(ii) At Ic determined by vθf′ (Ic) = i, we have ye
c (Ic) < IcB/∇.
Part (ii) means that innovative ﬁrms are constrained. These ﬁrms are highly produc-
tive (θc > 1) and have large investment opportunities but little internal assets as a result
of prior R&D spending, Ac = A−k +σ < Au. These two characteristics make innovative
ﬁrms ﬁnance constrained.
We show below that a constrained ﬁrm beneﬁts from attracting monitoring capital
even though it is more expensive than passive bank credit. Given the higher cost, the
ﬁrm raises as little as possible to incentivize the monitoring activity and sets a minimum
repayment ym
c = γIc such that ICm just binds. Given this repayment, the ﬁrm can raise
monitored funds Dm
c until the participation constraint binds,
y
m





mIc)/R = (pγ − c
m)Ic/R. (7)
Reserving a part ym
c = γIc of cash-ﬂow for repayment to monitors reduces the entre-
preneur’s residual income. To guarantee managerial eﬀort, the entrepreneur must keep
a minimum income given by the incentive constraint ye
c ≥ βIc which is much lower with
monitoring than without. Both incentive compatible income stakes limit the amount of
repayment that can be pledged to passive banks. Hence, the ﬁrm’s residual debt capacity
is restricted by (1 + i)Dc ≤ Ic+vxc−γIc−βIc where βIc and γIc are those parts of proﬁt
that must go to the entrepreneur and the active bank to assure management eﬀort and
monitoring. The active bank supplies funds Dm
c as in (7). The remaining part of external
funds must come from standard banks which need to supply a credit Dc = Ic −Ac −Dm
c .
Substituting this into the binding debt capacity implicitly determines the maximum in-
vestment level by (1 + i)(Ic − Ac − Dm
c ) = Ic + vxc − γIc − βIc. Multiplying by p, using
p(1 + i) = R, and substituting Dm
c from (7) yields
p(vxc − iIc) − c
mIc = pβIc − RAc, Ac = A − k + σ. (8)
14Proposition 1 (Constrained investment) With a binding ﬁnance constraint, invest-
ment is not driven by the user cost of capital but depends, instead, on pledgeable future
income and on accumulated own assets.
Figure 1 illustrates how investment is determined. The left-hand side of equation (8)
is the expected proﬁt and corresponds to the hump-shaped curve. Its maximum gives
the virtual unconstrained investment of an innovative ﬁrm where no excess return is
earned, vx′
c = i. The right-hand side of (8) is the ‘incentive-line’ starting out from the
intercept −AcR. The intersection of these two lines implicitely determines the constrained
investment level as in (8). At this point, the slopes satisfy p(vx′
c − i)−cm > pβ. In other
words, the ﬁrm earns an excess return and would like to expand investment but is credit
rationed. Financing a higher level of investment with even more external funds would not
be incentive compatible.2 Taking the diﬀerential of (4), we can thus state:
Proposition 2 (Excess return) Expanding investment of constrained ﬁrms would raise
expected proﬁt by dπc/Ic = ρ, where ρ ≡ p(vx′
c − i) − cm > 0 is the excess return.
Knowing investment yields the amount of monitoring capital Dm
c in (7) and standard
debt Dc = Ic − Ac − Dm
c which is residually obtained from passive banks. The subsidy
leaves the ﬁrm with more own equity Ac = A−k+σ and relaxes the ﬁnance constraint by
shifting down the ‘incentive-line’ in Figure 1. A higher price boosts ﬁrms’ future earnings
and also relaxes the ﬁnance constraint. It shifts up the expected proﬁt curve so that the
intersection occurs at a larger investment scale.
When intermediaries are competitive, ﬁrms keep the entire surplus in (3). Even though
the surplus is reduced by monitoring costs, it may still be higher than without monitoring.
2If ﬁrms asked for a marginally larger credit, incentive constraints would be violated, i.e. ﬁrms and
monitors would shirk and monitoring capital would not be used. Passive banks could still provide credit
by discretely raising the loan rate to iL > i until (1 + iL)p = R. Proﬁt ve
c would discretely fall due to
the rise in the loan rate iL and the loss in the value enhancing contribution of monitoring. We must
assume pL low enough so that ﬁrms do not prefer discretely larger credit I∗
c −Ac at iL, with I∗
c given by
vx′ (I∗
c) = iL. An equilibrium with shirking is deﬁnitely not viable if pL → 0.
15To see this, take the diﬀerential dπc = [p(vx′
c − i) − cm]dIc − Icdcm. The beneﬁt of
attracting monitoring capital is that it facilitates investment dIc because it boosts the
ﬁrm’s pledgeable income by reducing private beneﬁts, db/dm < 0, where m measures the
monitoring intensity. On the other hand, monitoring adds extra costs Icdcm. Clearly, if the
excess return p(vx′
c − i)−cm is positive, the larger feasible investment due to monitoring
is worth more than the extra cost Icdcm. For monitoring to be useful, we must impose an
assumption on ‘monitoring productivity’.
Fig. 1: Finance Constrained Investment
Assumption 2 Monitoring (dm = dcm) is productive and boosts ﬁrm proﬁts:
ρλ > pβ > ρ ≡ p(vx
′
c − i) − c







The assumption means that engaging active investors and introcing a small amount of
monitoring activity boosts the ﬁrm’s net present value. To show this, we deﬁne the relative
increase in marginal monitoring cost by ˆ cm ≡ dcm/(pβ), and of monitoring intensity by
ˆ m ≡ dm/(pβ). For a given investment level I, a higher monitoring intensity yields a
16percentage reduction in agency costs of ˆ b = −λˆ m with λ ≡ −pβ
′, which implies an
equally large percentage reduction ˆ ye = −λˆ m of the minimum, incentive compatible
entrepreneurial compensation. Monitoring thereby raises pledgeable income and boosts




  ˆ v +
pβ
δ
  (λˆ m − ˆ cm) +
AR
δIc
  ˆ A +
kR
δIc
  ˆ σ, δ ≡ pβ − ρ < R, (i)
where R > δ assures positive leverage, i.e. dIc/dAc = R/δ > 1. Given beneﬁts and
costs, monitoring (ˆ m = ˆ cm) is desirable only if the net impact on expected proﬁt πc =
p(vxc − iIc) − cmIc is positive, i.e. dπc = ρdIc − Icdcm > 0. Using ˆ cm = ˆ m and δ,
dπc = (ρλ − pβ)
βp
δ
Ic   ˆ m > 0. (ii)
The condition for monitoring to be attractive is stated by the ﬁrst inequality in (A2) and
consists of two parts: (i) there must be a suﬃciently large excess return ρ on investment
so that the extra investment created by monitoring leads to a suﬃciently large increase
in expected proﬁt. Since unconstrained ﬁrms do not earn any excess return, they do not
beneﬁt from and do not demand monitoring capital since it would only add to costs; and
(ii) monitoring must be productive, i.e. the elasticity λ > 0 must be suﬃciently large.
We interpret ﬁnancial development to mean that active banks get more productive in
monitoring, i.e. monitoring intensity m increases relative to an unchanged marginal cost
cm. Since more intensive monitoring reduces private beneﬁts of entrepreneurs, β
′ < 0,
the incentive line in Figure 1 becomes ﬂatter and rotates clockwise around the intercept.
In reducing the entrepreneur’s incentive compatible income, monitoring boosts the ﬁrm’s
debt capacity and leads to a larger level of investment.
Innovative ﬁrms have little own assets and large investment opportunities and are
heavily reliant on external funds. Being constrained, they beneﬁt from monitoring which
improves access to capital and allows them to invest more. Since active ﬁnance is more
costly, ﬁrms raise only the minimum amount necessary to guarantee monitoring, and
obtain the remaining credit from standard banks. Firms thus ﬁnance themselves from
multiple sources. The more productive monitoring is, the more external funds ﬁrms can
17raise, and the closer they come to the unconstrained regime. We consider only a marginal
increase in monitoring productivity so that credit constraints are only partly relaxed and
innovative ﬁrms are still rationed. Standard, less innovative ﬁrms have relatively large
own assets and few investment opportunities. They are thus able to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best
investment level and earn no more than the normal return on capital.
Fig. 2: Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
Figure 2 compares investment and proﬁt of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. Ex-
pected proﬁt of innovative ﬁrms is larger at every level of investment, investment of
unconstrained ﬁrms maximizes expected value since the incentive constraint is slack, and
investment of innovative ﬁrms is constrained. As illustrated in Figure 2, we impose para-
meter restrictions such that innovative ﬁrms invest at a larger scale, Ic > Iu.3
3Suppose monitoring is absent. For a given price v, we restrict parameters k, A, θ and β such that
(i) standard ﬁrms are unconstrained; (ii) innovative ﬁrms are constrained; and (iii) invest more than
standard ﬁrms, Ic > Iu; and (iv) only a share of ﬁrms innovate (0 < q < 1). Introducing monitoring
makes innovative ﬁrms, by (A2), invest even more but λ → 1 reduces the viability of monitoring so that
innovative ﬁrms will still be constrained.
18Stage i, R&D: Initially, ﬁrms are assumed to be heterogeneous in their innovation
potential which is measured by the success probability of early stage R&D investment.
After making a draw q′ from the distribution G(q), the ﬁrm learns the early stage success
probability of its project and chooses the level of R&D spending, kj ∈ {0,k}. The private
cost is possibly subsidized by government. Firms with a type q′ project invest in R&D if
q′πc − (k − σ)R ≥ q′πu, giving the cut-oﬀ
q = (k − σ)R/(πc − πu). (9)
Figure 3 illustrates how discrete innovation choice splits the entrepreneurial sector into
innovative and standard ﬁrms. Types q′ < q strictly prefer to avoid R&D spending while
types q′ > q invest in R&D which turns them into highly productive growth companies.
Fig. 3: Innovation Decision
Ex ante, before the type of project is revealed, ﬁrms innovate with probability sk and
















19Expected proﬁt ex ante, anticipating R&D and expansion investments, amounts to
πE = suπu + scπc − (k − σ)Rsk > 0. (11)
From E ﬁrms in the entrepreneurial sector, skE engage in R&D, sjE survive the early
stage and psjE produce output. Hence, more and more ﬁrms get eliminated over ﬁrms’




q [(πc − πu)q′ − (k − σ)R]dG(q′) is
positive since πc > πu > 0, and reﬂects a rent on entrepreneurial ability. The square
bracket is zero for the cut-oﬀ q but strictly positive for q′ > q.
3.3 General Equilibrium
Equilibrium reﬂects individually optimal behavior, a binding ﬁscal budget, and market
clearing in loanable funds and sectoral output markets. By Walras’ Law, one of these
conditions is implied by the others. Consider ﬁrst equilibrium in the loanable funds
market such that supply of funds equals demand,
A(1 − E) + Ac (sk − sc)E + Au (1 − sk − su)E =
￿
j (Ij − Aj)sjE + Z + σskE.
The supply of loanable funds on the left hand side consists of (i) savings of 1−E investors;
(ii) residual savings Ac = A − k + σ of failed innovative ﬁrms; and (iii) residual savings
Au = A of failed standard ﬁrms. Demand on the right hand side includes (i) loans for
expansion investments of both types of ﬁrms; (ii) investment in the safe Z-technology;
and (iii) government debt issued to ﬁnance upfront R&D subsidies. Rearranging yields
A = Z + K   E, K ≡ skk +   I,   I ≡
￿
j sjIj, (12)
where K denotes average investment per ﬁrm, consisting of R&D and expansion invest-
ment, and Z is residual investment in the Ricardian sector.
At the beginning, skE innovating ﬁrms receive an R&D subsidy. At the end of period,
the government collects a per capita lump-sum tax T from workers. Since tax revenue
20accrues at the end, the government raises funds σskE on the deposit market to subsidize
innovating ﬁrms, and pays back σskER. The ﬁscal budget is
TL = σ   skER. (13)
End of period wealth is yI = AR, yE = AR + πE and yL = 1 − T for investors,
entrepreneurs and workers, respectively. Financial intermediaries are competitive and
make zero proﬁts on average. The intermediation margin of active banks must cover not
only the cost of credit defaults but also monitoring cost. These banks break even with
p(1 + im)Dm − RDm = cmIc per project where the right hand side is the cost of hiring
monitors which reduces sector 2 output. Total income is Y = πEE + AR + yLL. Deﬁne
average values by   x ≡
￿
j sjxj, and similarly for   I. Substituting πE and πj and the ﬁscal
constraint yields aggregate income Y =
￿￿  I + v  x
￿
p −   IR − cmscIc − kskR
￿
E + AR + L.
Use now the capital market condition (12), deﬁne sectoral outputs XE and XN, and note
the consumer budget in (1) to get the income expenditure identity,
CN + vCE = Y = vXE + XN, XE ≡   xpE, XN ≡ L + ZR +   IpE − c
mscIcE. (14)
The income identity reﬂects balanced trade, (CN − XN) + v(CE − XE) = 0.
Arbitrage and linearity of the Ricardian investment technology ﬁxes the deposit factor
R and the loan rate i by (4). Innovative sector investment   I is determined by interest rates
and a world relative price v. Equilibrium in the loanable funds market thus residually
determines investment Z in the standard sector. Innovation choice ﬁxes the composition
of ﬁrms in the entrepreneurial sector as is reﬂected in the s-probabilities which pins down
the supply side given that E is exogenous. Computing aggregate income Y yields the
demand side and the trade balance. World market clearing for the innovative good ﬁxes
the relative price v. Finally, Walras’ law implies equilibrium in the world market for
standard goods. In a closed economy, v clears the innovative goods market CE = XE,
and market clearing in the standard sector follows by Walras’ law.
As a benchmark, we state the ﬁrst-best, unconstrained equilibrium. When private
beneﬁts are small and own assets after innovation are large, then ye
c (Ic) > IcB/∇ in part
21(ii) of Assumption 1. Monitoring is not useful and not demanded so that cm = 0. The
only change is that investment and proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms are now given by
vθf
′ (Ic) = i, πc = p(vxc − iIc). (6’)
The excess return is zero, ρ = 0. All other elements of the equilibrium are unchanged.
4 Small Open Economy
In this section, we study how three distinct areas of policy intervention, import protection,
R&D subsidies and ﬁnancial development, can shape the trade structure and aﬀect welfare
in a small open economy. When analyzing import protection, we assume the country to
be an importer of innovative goods.4 Buyer arbitrage links domestic and foreign prices
by v = τv∗ where τ ￿ 1 is a measure of non-tariﬀ barriers. A small open economy cannot
aﬀect the common world price v∗ of the innovative good in all other countries. Hence,
import protection raises the domestic price by ˆ v = ˆ τ. When studying the R&D subsidy,
we assume the initial equilibrium to be untaxed, i.e. σ = T = 0 at the outset, which
avoids complicated tax base eﬀects.
4.1 Firm Level Adjustment
Standard and innovative ﬁrms react in diﬀerent ways to economic shocks. Standard ﬁrms
are unconstrained. Given that interest rates are pinned down in the Ricardian sector,
investment in (6) exclusively depends on the output price. Using xj = θj (Ij)
α,







A higher price boosts investment and proﬁts of standard ﬁrms, where the change in proﬁts
reﬂects the envelope theorem.
4If the country were an exporter, we could investigate an export tax to raise the domestic price.
22By way of contrast, constrained investment is determined by a ﬁrm’s debt capacity in
(8) which follows from binding incentive compatibility conditions. In contrast to neoclas-
sical theory, investment is not driven by the real user cost of capital but rather depends on
the determinants of pledgeable income, such as the level of monitoring, and on own assets
Ac as a measure of ﬁnancial strength. For example, improvements in the banking sector
may result in better oversight of ﬁrms which reduces incentive compatible entrepreneurial
compensation and strengthens pledgeable income. We interpret ﬁnancial development as
an increase in monitoring productivity of active banks, given a ﬁxed marginal cost cm.
The investment response of constrained ﬁrms is stated in equation (i) following (A2). To
compare with the unconstrained case, we rewrite this condition as
ˆ Ic = (ε + φv)   ˆ v + φσ   ˆ σ + φm   ˆ m, (16)











Setting φ-coeﬃcients to zero recovers the unconstrained case where investment is inde-
pendent of R&D subsidies and monitoring, leaving ˆ Ic = εˆ v as with standard ﬁrms.
A higher price stimulates investment of constrained ﬁrms as well although the price
elasticity is generally not the same. The mechanism, however, is entirely diﬀerent. The
stimulus comes from the increased cash-ﬂow and not from the change in the real user
cost of capital. Financial sector development in terms of higher monitoring productivity
also raises the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income and debt capacity and thereby boosts investment
by facilitating access to external credit. Since monitoring cannot play a useful role when
ﬁrms are unconstrained, it does not aﬀect standard ﬁrm investment. Finally, the R&D
subsidy strengthens the ﬁrm’s own equity after R&D spending, thereby relaxes the ﬁnance
constraint and boosts expansion investment. This is a novel role for R&D subsidies! The
direct eﬀect of the subsidy is to reduce private R&D cost and stimulate innovation (on the
extensive margin, see below). However, the subsidy also helps innovative ﬁrms to better
exploit the productivity gains frominnovation and the associated investment opportunities
23which earn an above normal, excess return. Since the R&D subsidy is already sunk at
the expansion stage, this second eﬀect does not exist when ﬁrms are unconstrained.
Unlike in the neoclassical case, constrained ﬁrms earn an excess return since they
are unable to fully exploit investment opportunities. For this reason, proﬁts with higher
investment levels, dπc = pvxc   ˆ v + ρIc   ˆ Ic. Relaxing the ﬁnance constraint and boosting
investment yields additional proﬁt in proportion to the excess return ρ net of marginal
monitoring cost.5 Substituting the investment response gives
dπc = [pvxc + ρIc (ε + φv)]   ˆ v + ρIcφσ   ˆ σ + ρIcφm   ˆ m. (17)
The R&D subsidy boosts proﬁt ex ante, net of the subsidy as in (11), but does not
directly change proﬁts πj in the expansion stage. Nevertheless, the subsidy indirectly
boosts proﬁt since it relaxes the ﬁnance constraint and allows the ﬁrm to invest more at
an above average, excess return.
Any policy that strengthens expected proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms relative to others leads
more ﬁrms at an early stage to pursue an innovation strategy. Directly subsidizing the
R&D cost similarly boosts innovation. Evaluating the changes at the untaxed equilibrium
with σ = 0, the impact on the innovation threshold is ˆ q = −(dπc − dπu)/(πc − πu) − ˆ σ




ˆ Ic − ˆ σ. The second term would not be present in the
ﬁrst best. In this case, the subsidy would shift up the proﬁt line net of R&D cost of an
innovative ﬁrm in Figure 3 (not drawn), leading to a lower innovation threshold. When
ﬁrms are constrained, the subsidy additionally boosts investment and strengthens proﬁts,
thereby rotating the proﬁt line to the left and inducing even more innovation. The Figure
also illustrates the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on innovation. Since monitoring is
useful only when ﬁrms are constrained, it cannot play a role in the ﬁrst best equilibrium.
However, since a higher monitoring intensity boosts the debt capacity of constrained
5Setting ρ = 0 recovers the unconstrained case. Firms would not want monitoring capital on top of
passive bank credit so that cm = 0. The impact on proﬁt would be as in (15) since unrestricted investment
drives down the excess return to ρ = 0. By the envelope theorem, a variation of investment does not
aﬀect proﬁts of unconstrained ﬁrms with a normal return on capital.
24ﬁrms, it facilitates larger investments with an above normal return and thereby selectively
strengthens proﬁts of innovative relative to standard ﬁrms. As shown in Figure 3, the
proﬁt line net of R&D cost rotates to the left and thereby lowers the innovation threshold.
Formally, by substituting the investment response in (16), we ﬁnd a change in the cut-oﬀ
probability equal to
ˆ q = − v   ˆ v −  σ   ˆ σ −  m   ˆ m, (18)
where all coeﬃcients are deﬁned in positive values,
 v ≡
pv (xc − xu) + ρ(ε + φv)Ic
πc − πu
,  σ ≡ 1 +
ρφσIc
πc − πu




A declining threshold means that more ﬁrms innovate. All three shocks boost in-
novation at the extensive margin, but only import protection and the R&D subsidy
would do so in a ﬁrst best world. Monitoring capital would not be demanded and
would not exist if none of the ﬁrms were constrained. When more ﬁrms adopt an in-
novation strategy, the share of high productivity ﬁrms rises, and so does average pro-
ductivity in the industry.6 To evaluate welfare consequences, we also need to know the
change in expected proﬁt ex ante, taking account of R&D costs as well. Since com-
positional eﬀects are related by qdsk = dsc = −dsu, average proﬁt in (11) rises by
dπE = sudπu + scdπc + skRdσ + [(πc − πu)q − (k − σ)R]dsk, where σ = 0 initially.
The square bracket is zero by discrete R&D choice in (9). Noting   x =
￿
j sjxj, expected
proﬁt ex ante changes by
dπE = [pv  x + ρscIc (ε + φv)]   ˆ v + [skkR + ρscIcφσ]   ˆ σ + ρscIcφm   ˆ m. (19)
4.2 Supply, Demand and Welfare
We now show how ﬁrm level investment and innovation determines sectoral supply, na-
tional income and demand. Aggregate supply XE =   xpE changes in proportion to
6Average productivity θE = sc
sc+suθ + su
sc+su. Since sc + su is a constant, innovation (ˆ q < 0) yields
raises average productivity in the industry by dθE = −(θ − 1)
q
2g(q)
sc+su   ˆ q.
25  x = scxc + suxu which is a measure of average output of innovative and standard ﬁrms.
Out of E ﬁrms initially, only a share sc + su =
￿ 1
0 q′dG(q′) survives the early stage and
p of those make it to the mature production stage. Noting the compositional eﬀects
dsc = −dsu = −qg(q)dq as a result of innovation choice, average output changes by
d  x = scdxc + sudxu − (xc − xu)qg(q)dq, or
ˆ XE = ζx,v   ˆ v + ζx,σ   ˆ σ + ζx,m   ˆ m, (20)






























Aggregate supply reﬂects intensive and extensive margins. A higher price for innovative
goods, for example, boosts investment and output of both types of ﬁrms. This intensive
margin is related to the ﬁrst part of the ζ-elasticities. Further, a higher price induces
more ﬁrms to innovate. For each ﬁrm that is turned from a standard producer into a
highly productive growth company, output rises by the diﬀerence in output levels xc−xu,
times the mass of ﬁrms moving to a higher productivity level. An R&D subsidy, raises
investment of constrained ﬁrms by φσ, translates into higher output αφσ per ﬁrm. Since
the subsidy stimulates investment only of constrained innovative ﬁrms, the average output
gain is scaled by the share scxc/  x. In a ﬁrst best, the subsidy does not aﬀect investment
(φσ = 0) and output on the intensive margin but it still boosts innovation ( σ = 1) and
aggregate output on the extensive margin. Financial sector development can play no role
at all in the ﬁrst best (both φm =  m = 0).
National income consists of capital income of investors and entrepreneurs plus wage
income of workers, Y = AR + πEE + (1 − T)L. Using the ﬁscal constraint and starting
from an untaxed equilibrium, it changes by dY = EdπE − skERdσ. Substituting the












26where ηs is the GDP share of the innovative sector and coeﬃcients are deﬁned as
ζy,v ≡ ρηiηs (ε + φv), ζy,σ ≡ ρηiηsφσ, ζy,m ≡ ρηiηsφm.
We also use ηi for the share of constrained investment in the expected value of output
per ﬁrm. Note how the excess return ρ magniﬁes income gains. In the ﬁrst-best, ρ = 0
and ˆ Y = ηs ˆ v. The impact of R&D subsidies or ﬁnancial development arises only via the
eﬀect on ﬁnance constraints. These policies thus help to implement additional investments
with an above normal rate of return while the alternative use of resources in the standard
sector, i.e. Z = A −
￿
skk +   I
￿
E in (12), would only earn a normal return, giving ZR at
the end of period. The income gains are, thus, proportional to the excess return ρ earned
by constrained ﬁrms in the innovative sector.
Assuming constant expenditure shares in (1), the demand allocation is vCE = ηY .
Using the change in national income in (21), this yields
ˆ CE = ˆ Y − ˆ v = −
￿
1 − ηs − ζy,v
￿
  ˆ v + ζy,σ   ˆ σ + ζy,m   ˆ m. (22)
Without a ﬁnance constraint (ρ = 0), a higher price shrinks demand by ˆ CE = −(1 − ηs) ˆ v.
The demand reduction is weakened by the income gains that arise when constrained ﬁrms
are able to expand investment. These gains are proportional to the excess return earned by
R&D intensive ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst best, the R&D subsidy would not aﬀect consumption, i.e.
the gains to ﬁrms are completely oﬀset by taxes, and neither would ﬁnancial development
be useful when ﬁrms are unconstrained.
A country’s trade structure and comparative advantage depends on the behavior of
excess demand, ζ ≡ CE − XE. Deﬁning ˆ ζ ≡ vdζ/Y yields ˆ ζ = η ˆ CE − ηs ˆ XE, or
ˆ ζ = −ζv   ˆ v − ζσ   ˆ σ − ζm   ˆ m, (23)
where coeﬃcients are, after substitution,
ζv ≡
￿
1 − ηs − ζy,v
￿
η + ζx,vηs > 0,









2g(q) σηs > 0,









2g(q) mηs > 0.
27As long as ρ is not too large, 1 − ηs > ζy,v must hold which implies ζv > 0.7 As long as
the square bracket is positive, the other coeﬃcients are positive as well. To see this, use
α = Icx′
c/xc, ηi = scIc/(vp  x) and ρ = p(vx′
c − i) − cm,
scxcα
  x
− ρηηi = [vpx
′
c − ρη]ηi = [(1 − η)vpx
′
c + η   (ip + c
m)]ηi > 0.
A higher relative price reduces excess demand and, thereby, imports of innovative goods.
A higher (tax ﬁnanced) R&D subsidy has the same eﬀect although it appears ambiguous
a priori since the subsidy also boosts income and demand which raises the trade deﬁcit.
However, the supply eﬀect clearly dominates. The same holds for monitoring intensity
which expands investment and supply and thereby reduces excess demand.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs do not consume private beneﬁts and active banks do not
divert monitoring activities. Agents are compensated with suﬃciently high income stakes
to prevent both types of shirking. Welfare is equal to real income, U = Y/vD, where vD
is the price index and changes by ˆ U = ˆ Y − ηˆ v, giving
ˆ U = [ρ   ηiηs (ε + φv) − (η − ηs)]   ˆ v + ρ   ηiηsφσ   ˆ σ + ρ   ηiηsφm   ˆ m. (24)
In the ﬁrst best, ˆ U = −(η − ηs) ˆ v, i.e. a higher price reduces welfare of an import
country with η > ηs on account of a negative terms of trade eﬀect. However, a higher
price strengthens pledgeable income, relaxes ﬁnance constraints and allows ﬁrms in the
innovative sector to realize unexploited investment opportunities with strictly positive
net value. This magniﬁes national income in proportion to the excess return where the
gain is weighed by the investment share of constrained ﬁrms in total output times the
GDP share of the innovative sector, and also depends on the strength of the investment
response. When the output price is given in a small open economy, an R&D subsidy
boosts welfare since it relaxes the ﬁnance constraint. It thereby strengthens income by
helping to exploit more investment opportunities with an excess return. Financial sector
maturation, as measured by a higher monitoring productivity m, improves ﬁrms’ access
7In the ﬁrst best, ρ = φj =  m = 0 and  σ = 1, leaving ζm = 0, ζσ = xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q)ηs and
ζv ≡ (1 − ηs)η +
￿
αε + xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q) v
￿
ηs with  v ≡
pv(xc−xu)
πc−πu .
28to external ﬁnance and boosts investment and proﬁts. Financial development similarly
raises welfare in proportion to ρ.
4.3 Policy Intervention
The following propositions summarize the consequences of seemingly diﬀerent areas of
policy intervention in a small open economy. The statements can be veriﬁed by the
comparative static results in the preceding two subsections. We ﬁrst turn to classical
trade policy, consisting here of protection by raising non-tariﬀ trade barriers. Protection
in an import country raises the domestic price of the innovative good and leads to
Proposition 3 (Protection) In a small open economy, a higher price boosts investment
and output of all ﬁrms in the innovative sector, but disproportionately raises proﬁts of
constrained ﬁrms. It thereby induces more innovation, strongly expands aggregate supply
and reduces the trade deﬁcit of the innovative sector. If the trade deﬁcit is small, national
welfare rises in proportion to the excess return on investment of constrained ﬁrms.
With a small trade deﬁcit, i.e. η ≈ ηs, the negative terms of trade eﬀect of a higher
price in an import country is also small, yielding a welfare gain from relaxing ﬁnance
constraints. This result might justify a small level of protection to help ‘infant industries’
with many constrained ﬁrms that are unable to fully exploit their growth opportunities.
The existence of ﬁnance constraints might be rooted in weak institutions like bad ac-
counting rules, weak investor protection and other weaknesses in corporate governance.
These shortcomings allow for managerial discretion and autonomy (high value of β), re-
quire large ﬁnancial incentives to incentivize entrepreneurs and narrow down pledgeable
income and the ﬁnancing capacity of ﬁrms. They could also be due to a rather immature
ﬁnancial sector with little eﬀective monitoring and oversight of ﬁrms which again restricts
access to external funding. While at least a small degree of protection might help to relax
ﬁnance constraints and yield welfare gains, there might be other policies aiming more
29directly at the root of the problem. One possibility is an R&D subsidy which strengthens
residual own assets and thereby helps innovative ﬁrms to gain access to external funding
and to exploit their investment opportunities to a larger extent.
Proposition 4 (R&D subsidy) In a small open economy with a ﬁxed output price, an
R&D subsidy relaxes the ﬁnance constraint and stimulates investment, output and (expan-
sion stage) proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms while non-innovating ﬁrms are not aﬀected. The
subsidy boosts innovation and thereby raises the share of growth companies in the innova-
tive sector. Aggregate supply expands on intensive and extensive margins and reduces the
trade deﬁcit in R&D intensive goods. National welfare rises in proportion to the excess
return on investment of constrained ﬁrms.
Whereas trade protection raises the output price and thereby stimulates investment
of both R&D intensive and standard ﬁrms in the innovative sector, the R&D subsidy is
speciﬁcally targeted on ﬁnance constrained ﬁrms which are most in need of a subsidy in
order to implement more projects with a strictly above normal rate of return. However,
the aggregate implications are similar.
Finally, we turn to ﬁnancial sector development, meaning that active banks learn to
monitor ﬁrms more eﬀectively without any increase in the marginal cost of monitoring.
The emergence of specialized intermediaries such as investment banks, venture capitalists
or ‘Hausbanken’ with close ties to their client ﬁrms is driven by the existence of con-
strained ﬁrms. The role of these intermediaries is to improve access to the capital market
by monitoring ﬁrms, containing possible managerial misbehavior and, thereby, raising a
ﬁrm’s debt capacity. These banks perform a certiﬁcation role. Observing that a ﬁrm
attracts ﬁnancing from an active investment bank, other more passive banks can trust in
good corporate governance and will be able to lend more as well. By this mechanism,
ﬁnancial sector maturation improves access to external ﬁnancing and facilitates invest-
ment of constrained, innovative ﬁrms. Obviously, unconstrained ﬁrms have no problem
in raising external funds and therefore do not demand monitoring capital. Financial
development is inconsequential for these ﬁrms.
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put price, a higher monitoring productivity relaxes the ﬁnance constraint and stimulates
investment, output and (expansion stage) proﬁts of innovative ﬁrms while non-innovating
ﬁrms are not aﬀected. The subsidy boosts innovation and thereby raises the share of growth
companies in the innovative sector. Aggregate supply expands on intensive and extensive
margins and reduces the trade deﬁcit in R&D intensive goods. National welfare rises in
proportion to the excess return on investment of constrained ﬁrms.
We have discussed three rather diﬀerent policy areas that could boost welfare in a
small open economy when part of innovative sector ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. Can
these policies be compared in any way? Given a certain improvement in ﬁnancial sector
eﬃciency, as measured in terms of monitoring intensity, what is the size of the R&D
subsidy and of trade protection that would yield the same welfare gains?
Proposition 6 (Relative policy eﬀectiveness) In a small open economy with a small
trade deﬁcit in innovative goods, protection, R&D subsidies and ﬁnancial sector devel-
opment have equivalent eﬀects on constrained investment and on national welfare, if the
shocks are related by vpxcˆ v = kRˆ σ = pβIcλˆ m.
First note that this statement excludes terms of trade eﬀects by assuming balanced
trade, i.e. η = ηs. The aim is to understand how protection aﬀects ﬁnancial frictions
by raising the domestic price and not mix the welfare gains with terms of trade eﬀects.
However, in our model with homogeneous goods, protection is relevant only when the
country is an importer. The proposition thus assumes an ‘inﬁnitesimally small’ trade
deﬁcit in innovative goods so that consumer arbitrage leads to an increase in the domestic
price as a result of protection. Given this qualiﬁcation, and dividing the relationship by
δIc yields (ε + φv) ˆ v = φσˆ σ = φm ˆ m and, thus, equally large eﬀects of the three alternative
policies on constrained ﬁrm investment, see (16), and on national welfare, see (24).
To obtain a more quantitative interpretation of the policy shocks, note that ye = βIc
is the entrepreneur’s minimum incentive compatible income which can be reduced with
31more eﬀective monitoring by ˆ ye = −λˆ m, see the analysis following (A2). Consider now
an increase in monitoring intensity that leads to a one percentage point reduction in the
entrepreneur’s incentive income, i.e. λˆ m = 1. Given the above relationship, an equally
sized welfare gain could be achieved with an R&D subsidy equal to ˆ σ = pye/kR or dσ =
pye/R which is the discounted value of the expected entrepreneurial income. Alternatively,
given that protection raises the domestic price by ˆ v = ˆ τ, the welfare equivalent level of
tariﬀ protection is ˆ τ = ye/(vxc) which is the entrepreneur’s incentive income as a share
of the sales value of the ﬁrm. Observe, however, that this policy equivalence does not
carry over to innovation or aggregate supply. Looking at the change in the innovation
threshold in (18) shows that the R&D subsidy boosts innovation more than ﬁnancial sector
development since the subsidy boosts innovation even in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions
while more intensive monitoring does not. A similar argument applies to a protection
induced price increase.
5 Large Open Economies
In a large open economy, a supply side expansion reduces the world price of innovative
goods which feeds back negatively on the domestic economy since a lower price erodes
the ﬁnancing capacity of constrained ﬁrms and leads to a counterveiling welfare eﬀect. In
analyzing world equilibrium, we assume the home country to be an importer of innovative
goods so that the rest of the world in total must be exporting, although each individual
foreign country may be an importer or an exporter. When the home economy is importing
innovative goods, the price at home rises with import protection, v = τv∗, relative to the
common world price v∗ in all other countries, where τ = 1 and v = v∗ at the outset.
Equilibrium in the world market requires dζ +
￿
j dζ
j = 0 where ζ
j is excess demand in
other countries. Multiply by v = v∗, divide by world GDP, use country j’s GDP share by
ωj ≡ Y j/(Y +
￿
j Y j), implying ω+
￿
j ωj = 1, and deﬁne ˆ ζ
j
≡ v∗dζ
j/Y j. The condition
ˆ ζ
∗




= 0 for global market clearing pins down the impact on the common
price. Protection relates domestic and foreign prices by ˆ v = ˆ v∗ + ˆ τ. Using this, domestic
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v is the GDP weighted average of individual country elasticities. The small open
economy case results if the number of countries n gets large. This is most easily seen in the
symmetric case where ζ
∗
v = ωnζv, leading to ˆ v = −(ζσ/(nζv)) ˆ σ. As n → ∞ (implying
ω → 0), an isolated shock in the domestic economy has only a negligible impact on the
world market price. In a closed economy with n = ω = 1, protection is irrelevant and the
equilibrium price follows from ˆ ζ = 0 in (23).
5.1 Protection
If the home economy introduces non-tariﬀ import barriers, it raises the domestic price
above the world price level, ˆ v = ˆ v∗ + ˆ τ. The trade deﬁcit shrinks which creates excess
supply on the world market and depresses the world price, see (25). Since ωζv/ζ
∗
v < 1,
the domestic price increases, but less than in a small open economy,
ˆ v = (1 − ωζv/ζ
∗
v)   ˆ τ > 0. (26)
Protection raises the domestic price. Proposition 3 still applies, i.e. protection relaxes
ﬁnance constraints and induces a supply expansion. If the trade deﬁcit in innovative
goods is small, the home country gains from a small degree of protection.
We can now state the spillovers on foreign economies. Since all shocks by assumption
occur at home, foreign countries are only aﬀected by a change in the common price v∗.
Replacing v by v∗ in Section 3 yields the adjustment in a foreign country j.8
8The international welfare results from protection are similar to Egger and Keuschnigg (2010). That
paper did not consider an explicit innovation decision and the coexistence of constrained and uncon-
strained ﬁrms in the innovative sector. Further, the analysis of trade implications of R&D subsidies and
the discussion of ﬁnancial sector development is new in the present paper.
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world price v∗ and thereby retards foreign investments Ij
c and Ij
u, discourages foreign in-
novation by raising the cut-oﬀ values qj, and reduces (magniﬁes) foreign trade surpluses
(deﬁcits). (b) Domestic protection tightens foreign ﬁnance constraints. Welfare of foreign
export nations strongly falls since the negative terms of trade eﬀect is reinforced by tight-
ening ﬁnance constraints. Welfare of foreign import nations changes ambiguously since
the positive terms of trade eﬀect may be oﬀset by ﬁrms becoming more ﬁnance constrained.
The interplay between welfare eﬀects from terms of trade changes and ﬁnancial fric-
tions can generate interesting results on world welfare that would not be possible if ﬁrm
level investment were ﬁrst-best in all countries. One interesting possibility is:
Proposition 8 (World welfare) If (i) all countries are close to autarky and terms of
trade eﬀects are small and if (ii) the home economy is ﬁnance constrained while foreign
economies are not, domestic protection raises world welfare.
With terms of trade eﬀects being small and foreign countries free of ﬁnancial frictions,
they will not experience any welfare change. For the home economy, Proposition 3 applies.
Being ﬁnancially constrained, it beneﬁts from a strictly positive welfare gain since the
policy boosts investment with an above normal rate of return. Since the home country
gains while no foreign economy looses in this scenario, world welfare rises.
5.2 R&D Subsidies
Instead of protection, the home economy could subsidize R&D to become more compet-
itive in the innovative industry. Intuition is that an R&D subsidy targets ﬁnance con-
straints more directly than protection. In expanding the innovative sector, it drives down
the world price, leading to terms of trade eﬀects on foreign economies that are favorable
or unfavorable depending on their trade balance. A lower world price, however, tightens
ﬁnance constraints in all foreign economies and thereby reduces their welfare. The price
34erosion also feeds back negatively on domestic equilibrium, irrespective of whether the
country is a net exporter or importer, and reduces the possible welfare gains. Given (25)
and the results of section 3, we can state:
Proposition 9 (R&D subsidy in a large country) (a) An R&D subsidy boosts aggre-
gate supply, reduces the world price of innovative goods, and leads to a negative feedback
eﬀect on the domestic economy. Investment of unconstrained ﬁrms falls. Compared to a
small open economy, the increase in constrained ﬁrm investment, innovation, aggregate
supply and welfare are smaller. (b) The reduction in the world price reduces ﬁrm level
investments, innovation and trade surpluses in foreign economies. Welfare in foreign ex-
port nations strongly falls due to a tightening of ﬁnance constraints and a deterioration
of terms of trade while welfare changes in foreign import nations are ambiguous.
It is unlikely that the negative feedback eﬀect could overturn the direct eﬀects of an
R&D subsidy as they obtain in a small open economy. Obviously, the smaller the share
ω of the home economy in world GDP is, the smaller is the impact on the world price v∗,
and the smaller are the negative feedback eﬀects. The feedback eﬀect from a declining
output price is strongest in the closed economy. If we can show the welfare gain to be
positive in a closed country, it will a fortiori be positive in an open economy since the
negative feedback is weaker. In Appendix A, we give a condition such that the qualitative
results of the small open economy continue to hold in a closed economy. The condition is
that the supply eﬀect from induced innovation is not too strong, i.e. not too many ﬁrms
switch from standard, low volume producers to innovative, high volume produrcers.
5.3 Financial Development
More eﬀective monitoring and better oversight of ﬁrms boosts the debt capacity of in-
novative ﬁrms which face the greatest diﬃculty to access the capital market. Financial
maturation thus triggers a supply side expansion and drives down the world price by
35ˆ v∗ = −(ωζm/ζ
∗
v) ˆ m, see (25). The lower price reduces investment and output of uncon-
strained, standard ﬁrms and retards the expansion of constrained innovative companies.
The beneﬁcial eﬀects are thus scaled down.
Proposition 10 (Financial development in a large country) The reduction in the
world price dampens the supply-side expansion in the home country. Investment and
proﬁts of unconstrained ﬁrms fall. Compared to a small open economy, the increase in
constrained ﬁrm investment and proﬁt is smaller, implying a smaller increase in innova-
tion and welfare, and a smaller reduction of the trade deﬁcit in innovative goods. (b) The
reduction in the world price reduces ﬁrm level investments, innovation and trade surpluses
in foreign economies. Welfare in foreign export nations strongly falls due to a tighten-
ing of ﬁnance constraints and a deterioration of terms of trade while welfare changes in
foreign import nations are ambiguous.
In Appendix B, we give conditions such that the qualitative results of the small open
economy continue to hold in a closed economy. So they must hold a fortiori in large open
economies where the negative feedback eﬀect is weaker.
6 Conclusions
To investigate the interaction between innovation, ﬁnance and trade, we have proposed
a multi-country two sector model with capital and sector speciﬁc labor. A discrete R&D
decision splits ﬁrms into innovative and standard ones. Standard ﬁrms are unconstrained
and invest at a low scale until the rate of return is equal to the cost of capital. Given prior
R&D spending, innovative ﬁrms are left with little own assets, are highly productive and
could invest at a large scale in the subsequent expansion stage but are credit rationed.
These assumptions reﬂect the stylized fact that it is mostly the more innovative and
smaller ﬁrms, small in terms of little own assets, which have diﬃculty in raising external
funds. With investment being restricted, innovative ﬁrms earn an above normal, excess
36return on capital and have unexploited investment opportunities. The credit constraint is
partly relaxed by specialized intermediaries which actively monitor and supervise ﬁrms,
thereby raise their debt capacity and allow them to proﬁtably invest at a larger scale.
Using this framework, we have investigated the role of three alternative policy ap-
proaches which address ﬁnancial frictions in distinct ways. Assuming We ﬁnd that im-
port protection, in raising the domestic price and earnings per ﬁrm, also boosts the debt
capacity of constrained ﬁrms. Protection thereby relaxes ﬁnance constraints and allows
innovative ﬁrms with an above normal return to invest at a larger scale. For this reason,
a small level of protection can raise domestic welfare, provided that terms of trade eﬀects
in the importing country are small. The second policy is an R&D subsidy which boosts
innovation and welfare, not because of knowledge spillovers which are excluded in our
model, but because these subsidies strengthen the internal funds. Being left with larger
own assets after R&D spending, innovating ﬁrms succeed to attract a larger amount of
external funds, allowing them to more fully exploit proﬁtable investment opportunities
with an excess return. The policy again boosts national welfare and shifts comparative
advantage towards the innovative sector.
Finally, we investigate the consequences of ﬁnancial sector development which we inter-
pret to mean that active banks become more productive in monitoring ﬁrms. The higher
monitoring productivity again raises ﬁrms’ debt capacity, relaxes ﬁnance constraints in
the innovative sector and boosts national welfare. While all three policies reduce ﬁnan-
cial frictions and yield welfare gains at home, the consequences on foreign welfare are
less clear and depend on the speciﬁc interaction of terms of trade eﬀects and ﬁnancial
frictions. The reduction in the world price strongly hurts foreign export nations, not only
because of a negative terms of trade eﬀect, but also because a lower price tightens ﬁnance
constraints. Welfare in foreign import countries changes ambiguously since terms of trade
and ﬁnancial frictions work in opposite ways.
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A. R&D Subsidy in a Closed Economy In autarky, where η = ηs, an R&D subsidy
reduces the equilibrium output price by ˆ v = −(ζσ/ζv)   ˆ σ. Plugging into (24) yields
ˆ U = ρηiηs [(ε + φv)ˆ v + φσˆ σ] or
ˆ U = ρ   ηiη σ/ζv   ˆ σ,  σ ≡ φσζv − (ε + φv)ζσ. (A.1)
Clearly, there is an ambiguous welfare eﬀect that stems from the negative consequences
of the falling output price on the ﬁnance constraint. Evaluating the coeﬃcient, we ﬁnd
 σ ≡ φσ
￿









Γ ≡ (ε + φv) σ −  vφσ = [(1 − q)xc + qxu]pv/(δIc) > 0,
where the last equality uses q = kR/(πc − πu). The subsidy boosts welfare if innovation
and ﬁrm composition are exogenous or inelastic ( σ → 0,  v → 0 implying Γ → 0 and
 σ > 0). The coeﬃcient  σ is also positive if xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q) is small, i.e. if the subsidy
moves only a few ﬁrms from the unconstrained to the constrained regime.
The falling price also oﬀsets the direct eﬀect of the subsidy on constrained investment.
Substituting the equilibrium price change into ˆ Ic = (ε + φv)   ˆ v + φσ   ˆ σ yields
ˆ Ic =  σ/ζv   ˆ σ, (A.2)
where  σ = φσζv − (ε + φv)ζσ is given above and is positive under the same conditions.
Finally, by (18), the extensive innovation margin in a closed economy changes by
ˆ q = − v   ˆ v −  σ   ˆ σ = −
 q
ζv
  ˆ σ,  q =  σζv −  vζσ > 0. (A.3)
In the ﬁrst best,  σ ≡ 1 and ζx,v ≡ αε + xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q) v and ζv ≡ (1 − ηs)η + αεηs +
xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q) vηs and ζσ = xc−xu
¯ x q2g(q)ηs, giving  q = (1 − ηs)η + αεηs > 0. In general,
we compute  q =  σζv −  vζσ. Noting Γ = (ε + φv) σ −  vφσ from above, we have
 q =  σ
￿











ηsφσ v − ρηηiηs   Γ,
 q =  σ
￿











38where the second line follows upon expanding φv in the ﬁrst square bracket to φv +ε−ε.
Since scxcα
¯ x − ρηηi > 0 as noted subsequent to (23), an innovation subsidy clearly boosts
innovation in a closed economy as well.
B. Financial Development in a Closed Economy: In autarky, the price reduction
is ˆ v = −(ζm/ζv) ˆ m. Plugging into (24) yields ˆ U = ρηiη[(ε + φv) ˆ v + φm ˆ m] or
ˆ U = ρ   ηiη m/ζv   ˆ m > 0,  m ≡ φmζv − (ε + φv)ζm > 0. (B.1)
By rewriting the coeﬃcient  m, we can show it to be positive,
 m = φmη
￿










Γm ≡ φm v − (ε + φv) m =
pv (xc − xu)
πc − πu
φm > 0.
Clearly, ﬁnancial development boosts welfare in a closed economy.
Constrained investment changes by ˆ Ic = (ε + φv) ˆ v + φm ˆ m. Substituting the equilib-
rium price cut leaves a net positive investment stimulus in the closed economy,
ˆ Ic = ( m/ζv)   ˆ m. (B.2)
The innovation threshold in (18) changes by ˆ q = − vˆ v −  m ˆ m, which gives
ˆ q = − /ζv   ˆ m,   ≡  mζv −  vζm. (B.3)
To sign of  , note Γm > 0, expand φv to φv + ε − ε, collect terms involving Γm, and use
α = Icx′
c/xc as well as ηi = scIc/(vp  x) and ρ = p(vx′
c − i) − cm,
  ≡  m
￿











where the second square bracket scxc
¯ x α − ρηηi is positive by the result noted after (23).
So, in principle, ﬁnancial development aﬀects innovation in an ambiguous way since Γm is
positive. In a large open economy, the feedback is scaled down, so that innovation must
be encouraged if the economy’s weight in the world economy is not too large.
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